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The politics of river basin organizations: institutional design choices,
coalitions, and consequences
Dave Huitema 1,2 and Sander Meijerink 3
ABSTRACT. The idea that ecosystem management should be approached at the bioregional scale is central to the thinking on adaptive
governance. Taken to the domain of water management, a bioregional approach implies the foundation of river basin organizations
(RBOs), a notion that has been warmly welcomed by scholars and practitioners alike. However, it appears that river basin organizations
come in various shapes and sizes, their intended foundation often leads to resistance, and their actual performance is understudied.
Through this special feature we seek to advance the state of our knowledge in this respect. Through this introduction we lay the
foundation for the case studies that follow in the special feature and for the conclusions. We do so by presenting a worked typology of
river basin organizations. This typology helps us differentiate between various kinds of proposals that are all referred to as river basin
organizations, but that are actually quite different in nature. In addition, in this introduction we present an approach to dissecting the
inevitable political debates that ensue once a proposal to found a river basin organization is made, something that is often ill understood
by the proponents of river basin organizations. After this, we explain the criteria that one could use to assess the performance of river
basin organizations that actually come into being. Although the thinking in adaptive governance is strongly concerned with ecological
effectiveness, we do show that other criteria can be applied too. Finally, we briefly introduce the various contributions to the special
feature.
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SHIFTS IN WATER GOVERNANCE
Water and human development are inextricably linked. Human
settlement tends to concentrate along rivers and coasts. This is
because waters offer fertile soils, opportunities for irrigation, and
possibilities for transport and trade. To use the possibilities of the
water as much as possible and to reduce the risks associated with
human settlement close to water, social organization and systems
of governance are required. Arguably because water is such a
crucial element in societal development, many ancient societies
had to make decisions about their water management
organizations early. The degree to which organizations founded
for water management influence later traditions of governing is
under debate. There is an old claim that the organization of water
management, which can be centralized and focused on large scale
infrastructure or rather decentralized and focused on local
management, determined the governance system of entire
empires (Wittfogel 1957). But others suggest that it is rather the
other way around, in the sense that societies with accomplished
hierarchical governance structures were better able to develop
centralized infrastructures for managing water and thus to control
their water environment.  
Whatever the protracted history of water management and its
importance for broader historical patterns of governance that
have emerged since ancient times, the advent of the nation state
—depending on the country in question this took place in most
cases in the 18th, 19th, or 20th century—was a significant
development, and in most cases a serious break from the traditions
of the past. The nation state, built upon concerted efforts to
change social cultural preferences (so-called nation building)
through the crafting of new bonds of affiliation and a retelling
of history, implied a nationalization of responsibilities that were
previously at the local level, and has, since it took place, shaped
the division of responsibilities of what we now appropriately call
the inter“national” level. Water management was fully implied in
the process of nation building. In many countries, new water
works served to make fragmented countries more integrated by
physically connecting previously separate parts. Various such
projects became focal points for nation building by showing highly
developed engineering skills. New organizations for water
management were founded that operated at the national scale. In
the process of nationalization, previously established communal
and private elements of the governance system were overhauled.
In many cases this effectively meant an expropriation of rights
from private owners to state bureaucracies, who often started
using their decision power to further certain economic interests,
be it newly emerging industries that were allowed to use the
pollution assimilation capacity of water for the release of its waste
materials, or agriculture, which until today consumes enormous
amounts of freshwater for irrigation, often without being fully
charged for the costs.  
The process of building up the nation state had two elements that
are worth mentioning here. The first is that when it took place,
government institutions were often designed on the basis of a so-
called classical modernist design (Hajer 2003), embedded in
respective constitutions. This implied that government tasks and
responsibilities would be divided over respective layers of
government, usually three or four. Most of these government
layers were assigned a wide set of responsibilities (general purpose
governments) and because the boundaries were relatively clear
cut, a certain level of so-called jurisdictional integrity was created.
Nation states differ in many ways; they can be federal or unitary
states, the level of centralization can differ, the formal leadership
can be presidential or monarchical, the role of the judiciary can
be expansive or limited, etc. In many cases however, water
management tasks were allocated to general purpose government
layers, and thus became part of what could be called the normal
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government apparatus. Special purpose organizations such as
river basin organizations (RBOs) did not fit easily in this scheme,
although in some cases, such as the Netherlands, the water boards
that had existed long before the modern nation state were given
a constitutional status equal to that of municipalities. A second
element worth mentioning here is that in almost any new nation
state, issues of control loomed large. Democratic control,
especially in the form of representative democracy, has almost
universal appeal and has thus become the norm for shaping
control. There are however multiple models of democracy (Held
2006) and some of these models actually convey very little direct
citizen control over government institutions. Regardless of the
model of democracy that is applied by the elite in the new nation
states, the quest for democratic control has almost always been a
struggle, and the adoption of important democratic principles
such as transparency, accountability, and the replacement of
leaders by the polity too.  
In the period from the Second World War until roughly the start
of the 1980s, the role of governments in many societies across the
world expanded, often for reasons associated with development
of a welfare state, but usually also because this was an era of
confidence in the power of centralized, planned, and rational
problem solving. And the concept of the nation state, to the
chagrin of some who see the nation state’s sovereignty as a
hindrance for addressing many of the world’s problems, is still
very much a key aspect in developing responses to water problems.
However, the power of most nation states is slowly changing and
eroding, and power is diffusing to other actors (with or without
government oversight). This change, often described as a shift
from government to governance, started taking place around the
1980 and is depicted in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Shifts in governance since the 1980s.
The reasons behind these shifts in governance are often debated.
There is a strong ideological element in the sense that neoliberal
ideas, which emphasize the strength of market initiative and the
failure of government, gained currency in the 1980s. But in the
same decade another influential wave of thought emerged: the
one on community governance and self-governance. Both waves
of thought have academic roots in economics and the political
sciences. These and other social science disciplines affected each
of the shifts signified here in one way or another. Authors who
write about governance (e.g., Pierre and Peters 2000) also suggest
a less prosaic explanation for these shifts, mainly that the nation
state had grown too large to sustain itself  much longer. Especially
in some European countries, public spending amounted to more
than half  of gross domestic product, and the functioning of the
ensuing big government, often founded on central control and
planning, was considered suspect at best in many areas. Red tape,
over-regulation, and excessive bureaucracy became rallying cries
in the battle to hollow out the state (Rhodes 1996).  
The increasingly global discourse on water governance (see for
instance Gupta 2009), bears several traces of these bigger debates
and larger scale shifts in governance. The central guiding concept
of integrated water resources management (IWRM) for instance,
suggests greater private sector involvement in water management,
the establishment of pricing mechanisms, it assigns a large role
to independent experts by suggesting the greater use of decision
making tools like cost benefit analysis, it suggests more
international collaboration whilst at the same time indicating the
possibility for local control, and it underlines the need for greater
public participation and stakeholder involvement at all levels.
IWRM is often presented as a corrective to the errors of the so-
called hydrological mission (see Jaspers and Gupta 2014), the
spawn of large-scale engineering projects that went hand in hand
with nation building and the subsequent growth of nation states
and big government. The integrated aspect of IWRM is often
interpreted to denote more attention to the ecological and societal
impacts of water management activities, including the typical
large scale projects. It also denotes a geographical emphasis, in
the sense that water managers should start paying more attention
to the interlinkages between upstream and downstream
interventions by working on the river basin scale and founding
RBOs.  
IWRM is clearly a multifaceted concept and implementing each
of the aspects may require an extensive job of translation from
one context to another (Mukhtarov 2009) and weighting.
Obviously not all aspects are equally important to water
managers. It has been suggested that the so-called river basin
approach (also called the water-systems approach, see, e.g.,
Teclaff  1967, Lundqvist et al. 1985, Mitchell 1990, Mostert 2000)
is the key innovation that the water governance community is after
and preferably in a form that takes away power from normal
governments, that is away from elements of the nation state such
as provinces, municipalities, or states. Schlager and Blomquist
(2008:1) observe the following:  
For the last 25 years, prescriptions of the water policy
literature have centered upon two themes. The first is that
“the watershed” is the appropriate scale for organizing
water resource management [...]. The second is that
since watersheds are regions to which political
jurisdictions almost never correspond, and watershed-
scale decision making structures do not usually exist, they
should be created. 
And the plea for river basin organizations has not been without
effect. In a worldwide survey, Dinar et al. (2005) found hundreds
of transboundary basin organizations.  
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If  one were to analyze the introduction of RBOs from the
perspective of the shifts in governance noted above, it is not
immediately clear how they would fit in. To some degree, most
plans to found RBOs probably constitute a change in the level of
governance, for instance, from the national to the international
level when transboundary organizations are founded, or from the
national to the regional level when basins within a country are
involved. However, there are probably also instances where a river
basin organization is actually a civil society type of organization,
taking the shape of a water user association or water shed
organization, which would imply decentralization. And, it is
likely, in certain cases, that RBOs will be dominated by engineers
or scientists and would thus effectively constitute independent
bodies, which, given the fatigue about holistic planning, will often
be special purpose in nature, meaning that they focus on water
issues alone.  
Such design choices, like all shifts in governance that affect the
functioning of the nation state and its embedded democratic
mechanisms, have multiple consequences and are thus deeply
political (see Molle 2009). Our agenda in this special feature is to
focus exactly on the political dimension of river basin
organizations. This agenda has relevance for the debates on
resilience and adaptive comanagement, in which the notion of a
holistic approach at the bioregional scale plays an important role
(see Desmet and Cowling 2004, Davis et al. 2006, Donovan et al.
2009, Huitema et al. 2009). Cook et al. (2016) write the following
in their contribution to this special feature:  
Bioregionalism is a well-established philosophy that
seeks to better connect communities with the governance
of their local environment (McGinnis 1999).[...]
Although definitions vary, several features of modern
bioregionalism are evident relating to decision making
powers, scale, participation, and knowledge use in
governing environmental resources, in addition to
environmental justice. For proponents, devolving powers
to local communities, situated within ecologically distinct
bioregions, can empower them to determine more
effective environmental governance through utilizing
local knowledge (Sale 1985, Aberley 1999, McGinnis 1999). 
Cook et al. (2016) continue by suggesting that questions abound
around the practical achievement and effectiveness of a
bioregional approach, the social and economic meaning of
bioregions in the real world, and around the institutional design
of bioregional organizations. In this special feature, we advance
this agenda that is so relevant to Ecology and Society by focusing
on water specifically, and by asking a set of four interrelated
questions that will guide the contributions to this special feature
and that also steered a larger set of case studies reported in
Huitema and Meijerink (2014) that we will also refer to here:  
1. What are institutional design characteristics of river basin
organizations and how were their geographical boundaries
chosen? 
2. Who supported and who resisted the founding or reform of
river basin organizations? 
3. How well do the river basin organizations function in a
democratic sense and in terms of realizing coordination and
environmental effectiveness, and to which degree can this
performance be attributed to the institutional design of these
organizations and their geographical delineation? 
4. What are the implications of these findings for those who
are involved in institutional design or reform processes in
the water sector? 
We shall attempt to answer these four questions for river basin
organizations that operate within the boundaries of certain nation
states, and we explicitly do not focus on transboundary basin
organizations. Water management is but one of the many policy
domains in which independent, special purpose organizations
have been created, but for several reasons this policy domain offers
particularly fertile ground for an exploration of the research
questions posed above. First, there is a long and rich history of
special purpose organizations in water management (compare
Molle 2008 and 2009, Molle and Wester 2009; Delli Priscoli,
unpublished manuscript, http://transboundarywater.geo.orst.
edu/research/case_studies/Documents/RiverBasinOrganizations.
pdf). The history of river basin organizations makes it possible
to study their evolution, to trace the impacts that various new
discourses have had on their institutional design, and to draw
lessons from the experiences that water managers have gained
with these special purpose organizations. Second, many water
problems are pressing issues. The complex relationships between
land-use and water management and between upstream and
downstream water users have caused serious water conflicts in
many river basins and climate change might exacerbate the
tensions. Because of the rapid economic development in large
parts of the world along with expected climate change, both the
number and the seriousness of water conflicts is expected to
increase in the near future. How to design institutions that are
able to deal with these issues and conflicts effectively is one of the
key challenges for earth-system governance in this century. To
make it clear, this introduction is a reproduction of the chapter
“The Politics of River Basin Organisations. Institutional Design
Choices, Coalitions and Consequences” taken from our edited
book under the same title (Huitema and Meijerink 2014). Only
small updates, minor changes in the reference list, and several
changes in wording have occurred. Through this republication we
seek to link our work more firmly to discussions in the resilience
community, and our hope is that having work out in an open
access arrangement helps reach the widest possible audience.
Permission to republish this chapter was kindly granted by
Edward Elgar Publishers (Cheltenham, UK).  
With our research agenda, we follow in the footsteps of other
governance scholars who have worked on river basin
organizations. They have raised several issues in relation to the
institution and operation of river basin organizations, which we
will discuss in turn, taking cue from the arguments from Huitema
et al. (2009).  
First, governance scholars suggest that the boundaries of river
basins are not necessarily so clear cut, evident, or even natural
(Schlager and Blomquist 2008, Molle 2009). The idea of “the”
river basin suggests a certain simplicity, which in reality does not
exist because river basins are connected, sometimes by human
intervention, and nested. This means that defining the boundaries
of a basin requires choice, and this implies a role for politics.
Schlager and Blomquist (2008:15-16) state the following:  
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Boundaries are multiple, overlapping, and often
contested because people experience and attempt to deal
with a host of problems and opportunities that vary in
scale from the local to the regional. Drawing boundaries
is the first step in determining who decides and how and
with what effects. Different boundaries imply different
decision makers and different effects. 
Some communities may lose local control, whereas others may
gain more control. Especially those who benefit from the current
boundaries may object to reshaping the boundaries, for instance,
by pleading for a different underpinning of these boundaries (see
Molle 2009).  
Second, there are issues of authority, that is, issues of tasks and
responsibilities for the new organization (Schlager and Blomquist
2008). Governance scholars warn that large unitary (strong) river
basin authorities are just as susceptible to so-called bureaucratic
pathologies as any other bureaucracy (cf. Biswas 2004). Schlager
and Blomquist (2008) make the point that institution building
tends not to follow a pre-established design but in practice can be
better described as a patchwork. In composing the patchwork,
environmental concerns, for instance, are certainly not dominant.
Instead, economies of scale, the costs of coordination, and issues
of culture and political identity are said to be most important for
those active with the patchwork (Schlager and Blomquist 2008).
Interestingly enough, governance scholars suggest that a
patchwork of institutions at various overlapping levels may not
only be more feasible, but also more desirable from an
environmental performance perspective than a unitary river basin
authority because of the possibility for reorganizing the
patchwork according to the necessary task in a polycentric way.
Supporting the idea of institution building as a patchwork,
governance scholars, in empirical research, indeed find that the
pattern of institution building reflects the importance of
governance considerations (politics, institutions) vis-à-vis
environmental goals. For instance, Schlager and Blomquist (2008)
suggest that most American examples of river basin organizations
reflect their current institutional contexts, in the sense that they
usually do not have formal decision-making powers and
sanctioning authority. Conca et al. (2006) analyzed a worldwide
set of 62 transboundary river agreements. They found, among
other things, that (1) many agreements do not include all states
in a basin and that transboundary agreements are concentrated
in basins with a tradition of cooperation; (2) that the content of
such agreements depends on power relations between the
signatories, with the agreements stressing principles that are
advantageous to hegemonic states (Conca et al. 2006, for this
summary we built on Huitema et al. 2009). Such findings suggest
that in terms of institutional change theory (see, e.g., Thelen 2004)
river basin organizations are normally perhaps layered on top of
existing institutions, rather than displacing them.  
Third, governance scholars draw attention to the fact that after
founding a river basin organization, it becomes necessary to
formulate decision-making arrangements. In this respect they can
opt for two basic choices: the consensus model or elite decision
making. Consensus decision making runs the risk of gridlock,
whereas elite decision making may result, among other things, in
the oppression of minorities (Schlager and Blomquist 2008) or in
nonimplementation of decisions when influential stakeholders
have not been involved (cf. Ridder et al. 2005). In practice,
decision-making arrangements are a mixture of these two basic
options, which are perhaps at the extremes of a spectrum. This
point connects to an emerging discussion in the wider governance
literature. Although many suggest that the image of a neatly
ordered and organized government of yesteryear is probably as
much fiction as reality, most authors do seem to suggest that the
shifts in governance we have seen in the past decades have led to
a fundamentally new situation. Hajer (2003) has suggested the
term “institutional void,” which refers to a situation wherein
multiple organizations bear responsibility for (parts of) public
problems, and wherein their interrelationships have not been
prescribed from a central viewpoint, and so everyone is
responsible but at the same time no one is responsible for the
whole. Skelcher (2005) suggests that the foundation of the many
new organizations that now exist alongside the traditional
multipurpose government layers (our previous shifts in
governance) have diminished the sovereignty of government. He
observes how certain norms of democratic decision making
(representation, transparency, and accountability) are much less
relevant for the new players in the governance arena, and how this
could pose a threat to the functioning of democracy. Thus issues
related to the institutional design of such new organizations,
including RBOs, gather prominence and that is exactly what we
will be concerned with in this special feature.
THE DESIGN OF RIVER BASIN ORGANIZATIONS
As indicated, it is possible to associate river basin organizations
with several different shifts in governance, but it is not immediately
clear what is actually being advocated when river basin
organizations are being called for. We borrow from Elinor
Ostrom’s framework for institutional analysis to study the way
river basin organizations have been shaped. Ostrom’s work is
mostly associated with the management of common pool
resources, and she is often seen as an advocate of community
based management of (small-scale) natural resources. Our
reading of Ostrom’s work is that she has indeed called for greater
attention for a so-called third solution for environmental
problems next to the state and the market. However, one other
important message she brought is related to the importance of
institutions and institutional design on the one hand and the
importance of nuance in discussing the difference between various
institutional designs on the other (see especially the earlier work
in Kiser and Ostrom 1982). With her colleagues, Ostrom helpfully
clarified that institutions are actually nested sets of rules. Some
rules are merely operational and concern day to day decisions,
but others are much more fundamental for the actors who work
with these rules and might have a constitutional character. Taken
as a bundle (an institutional arrangement), sets of rules create a
so-called action situation that influences the actions that actors
can take[1]. Ostrom has suggested that different types of rules exist,
and that an analysis of institutional arrangements should take
each of these types into account. Ostrom introduced a rule
typology consisting of seven types of rules. Comments by others
(see, e.g., Hupe 1990, Heilman 1992, Sabatier 1992) suggest that
several of these types are overlapping and that certain types of
rules alone can carry the analysis. Taking their experience to heart,
we posit that five types of rules are particularly relevant for
analyzing institutional arrangements[2]:  
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1. Authority rules. These prescribe which positions can take
which actions, how actions are ordered, processed, and
terminated, i.e., competencies. These rules imply the creation
of positions, e.g., a river basin organization, and identify the
scope of the authority, e.g., the organization deals with water
quality only, and thus determine which so-called states of
the world can be affected and which ones not (Ostrom 1986).
The authority of other actors to have a say in the river basin
organization’s decisions is also likely to have an impact on
outcomes. Some river basin organizations are bound to be
influenced greatly by the input of certain privileged
professional bodies or interest groups, while it is also likely
to matter which “degrees of citizen power” (Arnstein 1969)
exist in river basin organizations when it comes to
(assumedly) ordinary citizens (see also the text on boundary
rules below). 
2. Aggregation rules. These prescribe formulae for weighing
individual choices and calculating collective choices.
Aggregation rules relate to tensions between individual
interests and ways of determining collective choices when
these interests are different. At a low level of abstraction,
aggregation rules can stress majority or consensus in certain
fora, e.g., in a municipal council, as an appropriate condition
for taking a decision. At a somewhat higher level of
abstraction, aggregation rules are about the philosophical
motivation for the decision. One possible aggregation rule
is to arrive at decisions that imply the greatest good for the
greatest number of people. In other words, the good decision
is the decision that maximizes utility for all (utilitarianism).
Even though some may lose a bit because of a certain
decision, this may be acceptable if  the rest of society greatly
benefits. Another aggregation rule could stress justice or
equity and thus forms of compensation. In this sense,
aggregation rules point to the type of rationality that needs
to be realized in the decision process (Diesing 1962). 
3. Boundary rules. These set the geographical boundaries
around the jurisdiction of the RBO, and the entry and exit
conditions for actors. They determine who is in and who is
out, and by which conditions. Legal rights to participate, for
instance on a water abstraction license or a water
management plan are sometimes assigned to anyone,
sometimes to all aggrieved parties, or sometimes to a
landowner only. What this means is that the number of
actors participating in the process is likely to differ with
variations in boundary rules, and subsequently different
interaction types may occur. 
4. Information rules. These establish information channels,
state the conditions under which they are open or closed,
create an official language of acceptable arguments, and
prescribe how evidence is to be processed. The management
of water may require various “types” of information such
as scientific knowledge, but also local knowledge. Rules can
identify which of these types is considered more relevant
and where they are to be obtained. 
5. Pay-off rules. These prescribe how benefits and costs are to
be distributed to participants in positions given their actions
and those of others. 
We expect that use of Ostrom’s rule types to characterize river
basin organizations offers opportunities for greater conceptual
clarity and analytical precision in analyzing them. We feel this is
necessary because the current literature on water governance has
produced many typologies of river basin organizations, but shows
few signs of convergence.  
To illustrate the point we briefly discuss some of typologies that
are out there at the moment (in the concluding article of this
special feature, Meijerink and Huitema 2017, we critically revisit
the added value of our own typology too). Mostert et al. (1999)
distinguishes between three models for the organization of water
management. Whereas in the hydrological model special purpose
organizations for river basin management (river basin authorities)
need to be established, in the administrative model water
management is realized by multipurpose governments, such as
provinces and municipalities. In the third, coordinated model,
river basin commissions are established and tasked with
coordinating action within a river basin. In the first model we
may expect conflicts between the river basin authority and general
purpose governments, in the second model other interests may be
considered more relevant than river basin management, and in
the third model, because the decision making rule is unanimity,
we may expect basin policies to reflect the lowest common
denominator (Mostert et al. 1999). Quite similarly, Alaerts (1999)
distinguished between secretariat type of river basin
organizations, authority type of river basin organizations, and a
category that Alaerts refers to as “other types.” The secretariat
type of river basin organizations are primarily involved in policy
and planning, typically have a small staff  component, and can be
compared with the coordination model described earlier. The
authority type of river basin commission has substantial executive
and infrastructural operational tasks and a large staff  component,
and matches Mostert et al.’s hydrological model. The other types
of river basin organizations are examples of “cooperation
procedures between existing regular technical departments, or
through dedicated departments within one central organization”
(Alaerts 1999:13). Because no new organizations are established,
this category resembles Mostert et al.’s administrative model.
Whereas Mostert et al. and Alaerts use more or less the same
typology of three types of river basin organizations, Hooper
(2005) presents a taxonomy of no less than nine types of river
basin organizations, which he inductively extracted from a review
of existing river basin organizations in different parts of the world.
He distinguishes between advisory committees, authorities,
associations, commissions, councils, corporations, tribunals,
trusts, and federations. There is much overlap between these nine
types, which makes the typology less useful for empirical analysis.
A final typology that we will discuss here is the one suggested by
Molle et al. (2007). They distinguish between basin authorities,
basin commissions or committees, coordinating councils, and
international river commissions. Basin authorities are defined as
“autonomous executive organizations with extensive mandates
for their river basin, undertaking most water-related development
and management functions. They are regulator, resource
managers, and service provider all in one” (Molle et al. 2007:610).
According to Molle et al. (2007) basin commissions or committees
focus more on policy setting and planning and often have specific
competences such as defining taxation or effluent standards.
Coordinating councils are deliberative decision making bodies
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incorporating public and private stakeholders and integrating
river basin policies. Finally, international river commissions are
set apart as a specific category because more countries are
involved in establishing these commissions. A comparison of this
typology with those made by Mostert et al. and Alaerts reveals
that Mostert et al.’s hydrological model and Alaerts’s authority
type of river basin organizations cover both Molle et al.’s basin
authorities and basin committees, and that Molle et al.’s
coordinating councils resemble Mostert et al.’s river basin
commissions.  
Both the existence of different typologies and the different naming
of RBOs can be confusing. Alaerts (1999:13) rightly argues that
the names can be misleading. “Agencies with wide ranging
executive tasks are sometimes called ‘Commissions’ or ‘Councils’,
such as the Mexican Water Councils and National Water
Commission, or ‘Boards’, such as the Dutch Water Boards.”
Therefore, while acknowledging the relevance of the empirically
based typologies discussed above, we feel it is time for a new
typology that is anchored in Ostrom’s work. Here we will work
with a typology of river basin organizations that distinguishes
between autonomous river basin organizations, agencies,
coordinating basin organizations, and partnerships. Autonomous
river basin organizations have a constitutionally guaranteed
independent position and have their own mechanisms for
democratic control. Agencies are river basin organizations that
are created by the state to perform a limited number of specialized
tasks at arms’ length from the government; they are accountable
only to (parts of) government. Coordinating river basin
organizations are collaborations of the founding government
partners and respond to them. Partnerships are bottom-up
initiated governance arrangements that are accountable to their
participants, which include civil society organizations. Table 1
presents this typology of RBOs and the accompanying
institutional design features, or rule settings.  
The typology we propose contains a set of ideal types in the
Weberian sense, which means that the types are theoretical and
pure concepts that will not often be found in reality. To see the
types differently would mean a denial of Ostrom’s main point,
that institutional designs vary in many possible respects and that
most of the differences do matter. However, we do believe that
scientific analysis cannot occur without a certain level of
simplification, and that our typology might occupy fertile
territory and a middle ground between treating all river basin
organizations the same on the one hand, and a full blown
application of Ostrom’s insights on institutional complexity,
which would lead to an unmanageable number of types. We find
Ostrom’s typology useful to color in these types, but do not
completely follow her contention that any small variation in a rule
creates a whole new type of institution. Instead, we will regard
those variations as a deviation from the ideal type.  
One of the goals with this special feature is to see whether the
typology can indeed be applied to real world examples of river
basin organizations; all contributors have been asked to apply it
to a case study with which they are familiar. But our aims go
further as already suggested by our central research questions.
Like Schlager and Blomquist (2008) we feel more attention should
be paid to the political aspect of institution building and
bricolage. Schlager and Blomquist (2008) point out that the debate
about water governance in general, and about river basin
organizations in particular, is currently technocratic in nature.
River basin organizations are often propagated as an alternative
to existing institutions, that are considered to be too fragmented,
too much driven by other concerns than water management,
lacking in expertise, and incapable of necessary action by politics.
Often an implicit assumption is made that these existing
institutions can simply be displaced (Thelen 2004) with new ones
such as RBOs, which then supposedly bring order and rationality
to water governance. Schlager and Blomquist (2008) make several
important points in connection with this. They suggest that
replacing existing institutional arrangements with river basin
organizations has important implications for the nature of public
decision making (in line with our discussion of shifts in
governance, and comments by Cook et al. [2016] in this special
feature on the meaning of the bioregion in reality). Moreover,
they suggest that open debate about water governance, stimulated
by various diverging organizational perspectives, is necessary in
these times of rapid change, whereas letting one organization
control water management issues could lead to lock-in effects.
Their central thesis is that “watershed politics” simply cannot be
avoided, even in a system designed to evade it, and that politicking
is simply the way things get done (Schlager and Blomquist
2008:195). Our special feature takes these notions further by
asking questions about the effects that politics has on the
feasibility and institutional design of river basin organizations;
in shedding light on these aspects we contribute to a better
informed debate in situations where river basin organizations are
considered as an option for improving the governance regime.
THE POLITICS OF DESIGN
As told by Molle, the history of river basin organizations suggests
that since what could be called the discovery of the river basin
and the invention of the river basin organization in Western
thinking (the Chinese were much earlier he claims), the concept
has been “used and appropriated by various constituencies to
reorder configurations of power” (2009:485). The point here is
that proposals to introduce river basin organizations tend to come
from parties who are motivated to change existing institutions
and reorder powers in decision making so as to better fit with
their subjective purposes. This insight is not uncontroversial,
because many advocates of river basin organizations see their
ideas as politically neutral and based on objective evidence,
suggesting that river basin organizations are more effective,
efficient, etc. Our contention is that such neutrality does not exist
in reality. Indeed, suggesting that river basin organizations will
bring improvement of sorts in comparison with the existing
situation, requires a normative position on what would constitute
such improvement (an improvement from which angle, for
whom?). Terms like effectiveness and efficiency suggest neutrality,
but applying them actually requires the expression of goals so
that it becomes possible to express in which respect an
organization is effective and efficient. Indeed, the history of the
discourse on river basin organizations (Molle 2009) shows that
these organizations have been put forward to accomplish quite a
variegating set of goals. Associated with utopian ideas of the late
19th century, the concept was associated with notions of full
control of the hydrological regime and multipurpose dam
construction from roughly the 1930s until the 1970s, then partly
faded and was revived to address water-quality problems, before
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Table 1. Typology of river basin organizations (RBOs) used in our study.
 
Types of RBOs Typical institutional design features
Autonomous Authority rules stipulate the independent position of the organization vis-à-vis other government organizations. Specify, which aspects of the
water cycle are exclusively controlled by the organization;
Aggregation rules. The organization is in full control over the issues within its jurisdiction. In certain cases, control over the decisions of the
organization may rest with an elected body, in others it will rest with an appointed and independent leadership. Natural science, engineering,
and economics play dominant roles in the decisions of the organization (rational decision making); technical quality of its work is of the
highest importance to the organization. The organization may have veto power over decisions by other government bodies that affect water;
Boundary rules. The geographical boundaries of the organization’s jurisdiction will be based on the (perceived) boundaries of the river basin.
The staff  working at the organization mainly consists of experts in the natural sciences or in engineering. In some cases the political leadership
may be elected freely. The organization is likely to have established procedures for involving (certain) stakeholders and ordinary citizens in its
decisions and sees this as a way to build a constituency;
Information rules. Arguments from the natural sciences, engineering, and from economics are valued very highly. The assumption is that the
body has the most relevant expertise on water, and tries to communicate this to other bodies, whose agenda is less water focused.
Accountability for decisions rests with the appointed or elected leadership;
Pay-off rules. The organization has its own source of income (for example, has its own tax base); the rules specify which groups contribute to
the income of the organization; these rules may have several bases, including the “polluter pays” principle. Spending is broadly related to
“water purposes” and payment of taxes will in some cases be related to having a say in the management of the organization.
Agency Authority rules stipulate a mandate that the organization derives from another body (for example, a ministry or a set of ministries). The
organization has a specific and limited mandate that orientates its mission; this can be economic development related, but also more focused
on ecological goals. Although the organization can work relatively independently and its actions will not continuously be watched, if
performance is not satisfactory the founding organization can discontinue the river basin organization. The organization is relatively free to
seek out ways of achieving its goals;
Aggregation rules. The organization has attained delegated control over one issue, but is likely to have little leverage over organizations that
have similar or related tasks, and coordination mechanisms might be lacking. Control over the decisions of the organization rests with an
appointed leadership, which depends on fulfilment of that mission for its continuation. Natural science, engineering and economics play
dominant roles in the decisions of the organization (rational decision making), but cost-effectiveness is the main guiding principle;
Boundary rules. The geographical boundaries of the organization’s jurisdiction will be derived from the government that establishes it. The
staff  working at the organization mainly consists of experts in the natural sciences or in engineering. The organization has few legal
obligations when it comes to involving stakeholders and ordinary citizens in its decision processes, but it may opt to organize stakeholder
processes in support of attempts to attain its goals;
Information rules. The organization has a duty to report to its founding organization and this line of communication is the most important
one. The organization must view its tasks in a narrow way, and only information that is relevant to its task is collected and considered. In
debates about its decisions, cost-effectiveness arguments play a major role, although engineering and natural science arguments are also
weighted. The agency sees members of the public as customers rather than citizens and approaches them in this fashion;
Pay-off rules. The organization has a set budget, provided by the founding organization to achieve goals that are stipulated in a specific way.
There may be rewards for (some) staff  members of the organization if  the stipulated targets are being met. Such targets may include
“customer satisfaction.”
Coordinating Authority rules. The organization has no authorities of its own, but it has been founded as a facilitator of coordination between organizations
that do have responsibilities in the field of water management. These bodies need to consent to the existence of the coordinating body and
their agreement will delineate the responsibilities that the coordinating basin organization can take up. In most cases this will include a
research and plan function. If  the organization performs well in the eyes of its founders, the tasks may be expanded;
Aggregation rules. The coordinating river basin is founded to better plan policy making, to avoid counterproductive measures by the various
founding bodies and to stimulate synergy. Because the river basin organization has multiple founders, diverging interests are present; the
founding organizations will have required decision making either by consensus or by large majorities (for example two-thirds of the required
votes);
Boundary rules. The coordinating river basin organization is likely to include organizations that are orientated toward very different
geographical scales, but the organizations involved cannot cross the jurisdictional boundaries of their combined territories. Because the
organization is fundamentally about administrative rationality (see under “Aggregation rules”), only government bodies participate in the
basin organization; there might be contacts with certain stakeholders, but the general public is not involved in decisions;
Information rules. The coordinating river basin organization does its own research, which generates information about potentially conflicting
measures or creates a larger, cross-jurisdictional perspective on problems and issues. To achieve good levels of coordination, the participating
organizations need a safe environment in which they can resolve their conflicts without too many onlookers. Access to information about what
is being discussed will therefore be restricted in many cases;
Pay-off rules. All participants contribute to the functioning of the coordinating basin organization, but keep most of their own budget.
Partnership Authority rules. The organization is a bottom-up initiative and has control over a resource that is commonly owned or controlled by the
partners. The partnership has a conservation or a sustainable-use purpose, and controls use;
Aggregation rules. Deliberation and consultation between the partners are key; decisions are made on the basis of consensus;
Boundary rules. Joining the partnership is on a voluntary basis. Social control within the partnership implies, however, that membership does
imply a set of obligations. As such social control is so essential for the functioning of partnerships, most operate on the local or regional level,
which is the level where participants can know each other;
Information rules. Partnerships put the concerns of the participants first. Local knowledge and local memory guides decisions, but not to the
complete exclusion of scientific knowledge, which might also be available. The key point is that such information is processed through the
prism of the interests of the partners. Partnerships are under no obligation to share the information they have with those outside the
partnership;
Pay-off rules. All partners involved are likely to have a direct stake in the decision process and they will seek decisions that protect the interests
of those involved. In some cases such decisions may entail costs for nonmembers, but such costs are considered less relevant.
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re-emerging in the 1990s as the cornerstone of IWRM, enriched
and blended with watershed- and ecosystem-management
approaches.  
RBOs have thus been proposed to further holistic economic
development and poverty alleviation, to serve agriculture and
power generation, but also to further ecological goals. In all of
those cases, the proposal to establish a river basin organization is
thus not neutral at all, as certain goals would be elevated over
others when the proposals are adopted. Moreover, the history of
river basin organizations shows that discussions about river basin
organizations are not only inspired by what is substantively best,
but are indeed also about decision power (power is both the net
and the fish, so to speak). In discussions about the reorganization
of the state in postrevolutionary France for instance, “[the]
concept was captured by political interests and served as a weapon
against centralization, as inherited from the Revolution, and was
supported by the land-owning aristocracy and by monarchists/
conservatives who sought to re-establish the pre-eminence of the
local” (Molle 2009:486). Perhaps better reflecting currently
ongoing discussions, Molle (2009:491) also argued the following:  
The Ministries of Environment have often invested the
river basins as a crucial scale for grounding their
legitimacy and assuring their role among pre-existing
layers of the administration for which, in turn, RBOs
have become sites where decision-making power over
financial resources and investments might potentially be
relocated at their expense. 
On this matter, the Global Water Partnership and the
International Network of Basin Organizations (INBO), both of
which have established regional branches, tend to favor the
establishment of “powerful” or “strong” river basin organizations
(Huitema et al. 2009, Molle 2009). For instance, the World
Resources Institute (see Cassar 2003:159) states:  
[T]he levels of authority that governments grant to
RBOs are obviously critical to their abilities to manage
their respective basins. The most successful RBOs have
strong bases of support among basin governments, and
high levels of authority through formal instruments like
legislation. 
In terms of Ostrom’s rule typology, the expectation is apparently
that basin governments are especially relevant constituents for
river basin organizations (boundary rule), and that river basin
organizations should especially be equipped with the power to
regulate (authority rules). But we know from the literature on
institutional dynamics that creating strong river basin
organizations requires the displacement of existing institutions,
and that this usually does not occur without resistance. Indeed,
the “incumbent authorities,” general purpose organizations, such
as regions, provinces, and municipalities, often have an interest in
curtailing the authority of RBOs because any increase in such
authority would come at the expense of their own power. Thelen
(2004) suggests that institutional change therefore often takes on
a different character than proponents of a wholesale makeover
envision. Rather than full-blown displacement, she and others
suggest that more common patterns of institutional design are
“layering” or “conversion.” Layering assumes that a new
institution, such as a river basin organization, will simply be added
as a new layer to an existing regime without replacing it, whereas
conversion is a process where existing institutions reinvent
themselves and start taking up tasks that they did not perform
previously, thereby perhaps eliminating the need for a new
institution. The politics of river basin organizations do not
therefore only pertain to the actual design of the basin
organization, but also to the redesign of other organizations. As
a consequence, grand designs and dreams of institutional
engineering can dissolve in practice.  
However, we should be careful not to always equate the push for
the foundation of river basin organizations only with “strong”
river basin organizations, even if  these are often preferred in the
global water management discourse. Molle (2009:491) suggests
that more recently collaborative approaches at the watershed level
have risen to prominence, for example in the United States:  
The watershed is becoming a central feature of new
philosophies or strands of activism like bio-regionalism
that emphasizes civic responsibility and ecological
stewardship [...] and is concerned with developing
patterns of governance that befit natural units defined on
ecological and community grounds. [....] As a result, the
river basin-level, traditionally invested by state
bureaucracies, is challenged [...] by the proliferation of
watershed oriented groups that emphasize the principle
of subsidiarity and signal the fragmentation of the basin
approach (compare Lach and Calvert 2014). 
River basin organizations are often the locus of conflicts between
environmental and economic interests, such as agriculture and
industry. Where the former aim to expand the scope of decision
making to ecological and environmental issues, the latter often
try to limit the scope of decision making to water availability for
economic purposes only. Other conflicts may be about the
information and aggregation rules, with some arguing open
decision processes, while others are more inclined to keep
information in closed circles, some suggest decisions should be
mainly based on expert knowledge, and others favor democratic
deliberation involving lay knowledge.  
Discussions may, however, entail any other design choice and rule.
More empirical research is needed to learn more about the main
controversies in designing RBOs, and the key actors and
coalitions involved. As stated, we proceed on the premise that
institutional design choices are political in nature. Such choices
define the authority of a river basin organization, the decision
making rules, or the penalties for those who fail to live up to
agreements made. Thus, if  there is a debate about introducing
basin organizations, or altering the existing organizations, we
consider it likely that parties involved in water resources
management and planning will try to influence the institutional
design of RBOs in a way that serves their interests best. In this
vein, decision making on the architecture of RBOs can be
conceptualized as a process of strategic interaction in which
actors with diverging ideas about the preferred architecture try to
gain support for their ideas. Such actors have diverging
preferences for various institutional designs. They may have an
interest in either limiting or expanding the authority of a river
basin organization, in consensus or majority decision making, in
the inclusion or exclusion of specific parties, and so on.  
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How do we expect the political discussion on design to unfold? It
will be clear by now that we do not expect such discussions to be
resolved by convincing arguments alone (be they scientific or
otherwise in nature). Seeing this as a political game means we
need to pay attention to the actions of proponents and opponents
of river basin organizations, and the different possible varieties
of such organizations. Like Thelen (2004) and Mahoney and
Thelen (2010) we assume a high degree of agency, that is,
deliberate action by those involved in the discussion. Unlike them,
we are not so much interested in labeling proponents of
institutional change (they use the terms “subversives,” “parasitic
symbionts,” and “insurrectionaries,” depending on the level of
change the players want to achieve; see Mahoney and Thelen
2010). Instead, we are more interested in the way in which
proponents and opponents create and use opportunities to push
their case (compare Huitema and Meijerink 2009). Disasters, such
as floods or periods of severe drought, are important windows of
opportunity, which parties may exploit to launch proposals for
changing the institutional design of RBOs. They may try to
enlarge their scope (for instance by the inclusion of water quantity
issues in their mandate if  they were previously not included), to
give them more authority or they may question their performance
at all. As we have learned from previous research on the roles and
strategies of policy entrepreneurs, framing and narrative
strategies are particularly relevant here (Meijerink and Huitema
2010). In the context of this research the relevant questions then
are which narrative about the causes of the disaster and possible
remedies becomes dominant, and more specifically, whether
RBOs are presented as a means to prevent new disasters. Political
windows, such as change of government or regime, may offer
opportunities for establishing, abolishing, or changing river basin
organizations as well because political parties may have different
ideas on the authority and other characteristics of river basin
organizations. Finally, parties may try to gain support for their
proposals in the multiple venues that are present in most modern
societies. If  they do not succeed in gaining support for a particular
reform proposal in one venue, they may try to gain support
elsewhere by shifting attention and action to another forum.
Because national, regional, and local governments and different
ministries may have different ideas about the necessity or ideal
institutional design of river basin organizations, they may be more
or less receptive to particular reform proposals. It has been
suggested that the game between proponents and opponents of
RBOS has a different flavor in various countries. Molle
(2009:492), pointing to the differences between the developed and
the developing world, argues the following:  
In the early years of the 20th century, river basin planning
and management were associated with centralism and
state-dominated large-scale infrastructural development
typical of the ‘hydraulic mission’, this is still largely the
case in developing countries, with some exceptions.
Elsewhere, river basin authorities have tended to
gradually morph into coordinating agencies and had
to reconfigure themselves in order to accommodate
local scales and processes, and the diversity of
stakeholders and interests. 
We expect to encounter such differences in this feature well.
EVALUATING RIVER BASIN ORGANIZATIONS
Part of the political game surrounding the foundation and design
of river basin organizations relates to the purposes they would
serve and the criteria that should eventually be used to evaluate
success or failure. The various parties involved in the discussions
on the design of river basin organizations, including different
ministries, levels of governments, and a wide range of interest
groups, all have different demands and will highlight diverging
goals for water resources management, hence they tend to use
different evaluation criteria. There is a host of goals that RBOs
could be asked to take up, and consequently quite a range of
evaluation criteria that these parties may use. These include
environmental, agricultural, or industrial objectives, but also
questions of fit into the overall governance regime. Here, we want
to limit our evaluation to a more generic set of criteria that may
be used to evaluate shifts in governance. The question that we are
interested in is his: to what extent does the RBO enhance
coordination, accountability, legitimacy, and environmental
effectiveness? In the following, we will discuss these evaluation
criteria and their relevance for the types of RBOs which we have
distinguished previously.  
We interpret coordination as pertaining to public decision and
policy making. The discourse about governance and shifts in
governance came up in an era when government bureaucracies
had inflated greatly. Proponents of smaller government
successfully argued that the real issue was no longer market
failure, but government failure. Government failure was seen
specifically in the impossibility to coordinate the multiple
government interventions and policies through instruments like
rational planning. It was relatively easy to point out the existence
of contradictory policies, for instance in the field of
environmental policy where a lot of policy activity was aimed at
undoing the policies of competing ministries such as agriculture.
As the debate on governance went on to become a debate about
the existence of policy networks and multilevel governance, it
became increasingly clear that coordination also has a so-called
vertical dimension, that is, that policies from different
jurisdictional levels also need coordination, which is provided by
planning in government bureaucracies. But the belief  in planning
has waned considerably since the 1970s. Hence there was a need
for other mechanisms to achieve coordination. As for the
government tasks that were not privatized or hived-off, the trust
in planning was replaced with a belief  in self-organizing networks
that would spontaneously create order out of chaos. Public
policies, or their governance pendant of voluntary agreements,
were expected to emerge from a process in which governments
were an equal partner to other parties (comanagement), and the
government task was one of facilitation rather than regulation
(for instance through seed money for water user associations).
Obviously, the ensuing process of consultations and dialogue does
require effort and time, and one may wonder whether the
coordination challenge may have gotten all that smaller. In fact,
in many cases where authors plead for strong river basin
organizations, their ambition is to do away with a lot of red tape
and coordination and simplify or streamline decision making by
concentrating power in the hand of one organization. This
thinking is probably most prominent among those pleading for
autonomous or agency type of basin organizations. Regardless
of which type of basin organization is founded however, water
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managers will always remain (highly) dependent on the
cooperation of other policy sectors and other actors. Although
from a water management perspective, the focus on hydrological
units is a logical one, the key to solving water management issues
mostly is with organizations who work on very different
geographical and jurisdictional scales. The dilemma thus is that
one may develop strong and powerful basin organizations, which
enhance spatial fit, but that these organizations remain dependent
on others for realizing their objectives. The issue has been
analyzed from the perspective of the term institutional interplay.
“Institutional interplay refers to boundary problems of a different
kind. The boundaries at stake here relate not to physical
boundaries, but to political responsibilities and social spheres of
influence” according to Moss (2004:87). The establishment of
large basin organizations with many competencies means that just
another jurisdiction is added, that institutional complexity is
increased, and that it may become more difficult to realize the
necessary interplay between all relevant jurisdictions (at various
levels of government). So the question remains: which type of
basin organization then is better at avoiding contradictory
policies, redundant organizations, conflicts about geographical
and jurisdictional boundaries, etc.? Which one is better able to
enhance synergies between water management and other policy
fields? Are these the strong forms of river basin organizations, or
rather the weak type such as partnerships and coordinating basin
organizations?  
Accountability is a concept that is increasingly discussed in the
debate on the shifts in governance that have taken place in the
past decades (see, e.g., Bovens 2007 and 2010 for a discussion of
the relevance of the concept in the setting of the European Union;
and Dryzek and Stevenson 2011, or Biermann and Gupta 2011,
for a discussion of the relevance at the global level). In water
management, the term accountability is heard less often. Water
management is regarded by many as an exclusively technical
challenge, which is apolitical in character and amendable to
finding the best solutions through engineering. This view has
permeated the recent history of water management in many
countries and it has had implications for the way decisions have
been set up. If  water management is a purely technical challenge,
access to decision processes should be limited to those who have
technical expertise. If  it really is an apolitical challenge, there is
little need for fora of contestation. Indeed, the models engineers
and other natural science disciplines use are then probably seen
as objective representations of the truth and there is little sense
in arguing about their underlying assumptions and philosophies.
In such a situation, demands for accountability can remain
limited. However, as stated, we interpret the foundation of river
basin organizations as a shift in governance, bound to result in
political contestation. And we have already demonstrated how
authors such as Skelcher (2000, 2005, 2006) develop critical
questions about the various shifts in governance that have taken
place around the globe and what these imply for fulfilment of the
criterion of accountability. Skelcher’s sombre reading is that shifts
in governance have implied greater fragmentation (a spaghetti of
responsibilities) and subsequently a lack of clarity in decision
structures. He also predicts a waning of centripetal forces in the
system, which means that collective decision making becomes
problematic. It becomes murky to understand who is responsible
for what, and when there are problems, all governing bodies
involved have an incentive to withdraw from sight and to claim
to not be responsible.  
But backing up a little, we should probably be clear on what the
term accountability means. According to Bovens (2007), the term
has Anglo-Norman roots and the word derives from the
bookkeeping (accounting) that property holders had to do for the
Norman kings. However, according to Bovens (2007), in the
English language the term has transcended the realm of financial
administration. It currently refers to reporting by governors to
their polity rather than the opposite, and conveys the promise of
fair and equitable governance. It can therefore be defined as “a
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has
the obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum
can pass questions and can pass judgement, and the actor may
face consequences” (Bovens 2007:450). Bovens (2007 and 2010)
has suggested that the concept can be used in a broad and in a
narrow sense. When used in the broader sense it is an evaluative
concept, and when applied in the narrower sense it refers to the
mechanisms for account giving. Here we are obviously more
interested in the accountability as an evaluative concept. From
that perspective it is important to discern between three rationales
for accountability, because accountability can first be concerned
with the democratic means to monitor and control government
conduct, second with the prevention of power concentrations,
and third with the enhancement of the learning capacity of public
administration (Bovens 2007:462-463). Here the logic we will
follow is that of democratic control. The key questions in such a
line of reasoning concern the degree to which institutions have
been effectively linked to the democratic chain of delegation,
which means that questions need to be asked about the degree to
which democratically legitimized bodies (or the polity) can
monitor and evaluate organizational behavior, and enable such
bodies to influence organizational behavior so that it is consistent
with their preferences. Bovens (2007:462) suggests that
assessments of the accountability provided by agencies or sectors
are often a matter of degree and “follow the logic of more-or-
less.” This is because assessments can result in the conclusion that
there is a lack of accountability (an accountability deficit), but
there can also be too much accountability, especially when a
“dysfunctional accumulation of a range of accountability
mechanisms” (Bovens 2007:462) has come into existence.  
If  we connect this more precise understanding of the kind of
accountability that we are after to the debate about river basin
organizations, we can conclude that the foundation of river basin
organizations (almost irrespective of the type) will indeed affect
accountability. However, this can work two ways actually. One
possible effect is that the foundation of RBOs contributes to the
fragmentation of authority and to what we labeled the spaghetti
of responsibilities. Plus, the new organization, the RBO, is likely
to be a relatively unknown entity, which, depending on its scale,
could actually be physically quite far removed from some of its
constituencies. It is, however, also thinkable that the foundation
of a river basin organization is a simplification of water
management and that the organization makes water management
rather more accountable compared with a situation where water
management tasks were part of the general public administration.
It can therefore not be assumed beforehand that river basin
organizations threaten accountability. In addition, the effects on
accountability can be uneven. One must not lose sight of the fact
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that transparency and accountability can be very unevenly applied
to various parts of the general public. In fact, the problem of
collusion suggests that water managers are extremely accountable
to one segment of the public (for instance farmers), but not to
other constituencies that might be equally relevant. This
obviously relativizes the absoluteness of the imperatives of
transparency and accountability. What is more, the issue of
accountability is different for different types of RBOs. The
agencies and coordinating RBOs, which we have defined in Table
1, are primarily accountable to their constituent government
agencies. If  these RBOs are given too much freedom in realizing
their tasks, accountability may become an issue indeed. On the
other hand, a limitation of their discretionary powers may come
at the cost of their effectiveness, which suggests that there may be
a trade-off  between accountability and effectiveness in some cases.
For autonomous RBOs the accountability issue is more
complicated. On the one hand one may argue that for this type
of RBO, accountability is less of an issue because these RBOs do
have their own (in)directly elected board. On the other hand,
because of the existence of such a board there often is considerable
institutional overlap with general purpose governments who also
address specific water issues. Although such institutional overlap
may contribute positively to the adaptive capacity of the water
sector, it may also lead to a situation in which citizens no longer
know which organization should be held accountable to specific
water policies. Finally, for partnerships, accountability is likely to
be about their relationship to the participating parties. Whereas
some may judge these partnership arrangements negatively
because of poor accountability to the general public, others may
emphasize their merits because they offer opportunities for
developing new practices of deliberative democracy or because
they offer new avenues for influencing water management
practices for actors who used to be marginalized.  
Legitimacy refers to the public perception of water management.
Countries differ in the degree to which the general population is
aware of water management activities, but the treatment of water
management as merely a technical issue could have a logical
correlate in lower public awareness. Once initial investments in
large-scale water infrastructure are made, it takes quite some
determination to keep their maintenance on the agenda and long-
term investment is often an easy political target for budget cuts
(see the recent discussion in the United States on the depleted
[water] infrastructure). And especially with flood infrastructure,
long periods without floods might instil a false sense of security
and this in turn may invite risky investment and settlement
behavior. Obviously, such periods of low public awareness might
be punctuated by extreme weather events such as protracted
periods of drought or rain. It can thus be argued that it is
important to maintain a certain level of public dialogue on water
issues so that water problems stay in the public view and mind.
Dialogue implies a bilateral communication process, and much
of the writing on public participation in water management
suggests that water managers can improve their operations if  they
use the collective wisdom of the crowd (although experts will
always remain important). This touches upon various other
aspects: using local or lay knowledge might help achieve
ecological objectives, improve cost effectiveness, and enhance
legitimacy. We will be the last ones to suggest that such legitimacy
only depends on dialogue, but one form of legitimacy, known as
input legitimacy, will especially benefit from such dialogue
because it refers to the way in which institutions effectively deal
with the feedback from the wider public. Other forms of
legitimacy include output legitimacy and systematic legitimacy,
concepts that refer respectively to the delivery of goods and
services and the broader feeling of support for the institutional
set up. It is difficult to say beforehand which type of RBO
contributes most to the legitimacy of water resources
management because this strongly depends on the way in which
a specific RBO involves the general public in developing and/or
implementing basin policies. From the perspective of input
legitimacy, the partnerships and autonomous RBOs probably do
better than the agencies and coordinating committees, but from
the perspective of output legitimacy this may well be the other
way round. The large variety and number of parties involved in
most watershed partnerships in combination with a decision
making rule of unanimity, may easily lead to a stalemate or to
decisions that reflect the lowest common denominator (Schlager
and Blomquist 2008). That is why one hypothesis is that
partnerships will often not deliver, and subsequently have a low
output legitimacy.  
The criterion of environmental effectiveness refers to goal
attainment in the realm of ecological issues. As suggested above,
most modern day proponents of river basin organizations do
expect river basin organizations to take ecological issues more
seriously than the existing institutions and hence deliver better
performance. But what are these ecological issues and how can
we classify them? Certainly since the 1950s and 1960s water
pollution has continued to be a staple element in the debate about
water management. In many countries, water quality issues that
emanated from petrochemical and other previously existing
industries (such as textile and paper production) became
increasingly controversial when their effects on nature became
clear. The impact of agriculture, through water abstraction,
through the use of fertilizers and pesticides should also not be
overlooked. But there are more issues. The hydrological mission,
often hinging on the erection of massive infrastructural
constructions, has had (and is having) enormous impacts on the
landscape, on the flora and fauna connected to the water system,
and the livelihood of countless people living in affected areas. The
environmental movement that started in the 1960s has battled
against such developments in many countries, often in
combination with other civil society groups. And then there is the
issue of climate change; although it is often thought of as a global
phenomenon, the local effects can differ greatly. Whereas the
predictions are that some climate zones will get drier, in others
more precipitation can be expected. And even if  averages in
rainfall and other weather conditions were to remain constant in
various regions, the frequency with which extreme weather events
(be they droughts or high levels of precipitation) occur is expected
to rise. Coupled with a pattern of economic investment and
human settlement in vulnerable regions, this has led to increased
damage levels in the last decades (for a discussion on the various
factors affecting such risks see for instance Bouwer et al. 2007,
Bouwer 2010). An obvious correlate of the variable impacts of
climate change is the fact that such damages can vary greatly
between localities and jurisdictions, including the ones that are
upstream and downstream of rivers. River basin organizations
are expected to help address such problems by connecting such
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jurisdictions, but also by focusing more squarely than general
purpose governments would do on the ecological aspects. But
whether such expectations really come true is still an open
question (for attempts to answer aspects of it see Dinar et al. 2005
and Schlager and Blomquist 2008). However, from our brief
summary of ecological problems that water managers face it
already becomes clear that such issues are becoming more rather
than less challenging. Climate change cuts through and across
jurisdictions, sectors (such as water and energy), and does not
stop and start at the boundaries of a river basin. Whether
autonomous river basin organizations handle such challenges
better than other types, as is often assumed, remains to be seen.
LOOKING AHEAD
In the rest of special feature the four central questions that guide
our analysis—about the design of river basin organizations, their
proponents and opponents and their effects on design, the impacts
that these organizations have, and whether we can develop
recommendations for those engaged in the discussion—will be
followed up. The heart of this feature consists of four articles on
river basin organizations, each addressing the first three questions.
These four articles were embedded in much larger comparison of
11 international case studies (see Huitema and Meijerink 2014),
contextualized by an overview of the global discussion on river
basin organizations (Jaspers and Gupta 2014). In the concluding
article of this special feature, Meijerink and Huitema (2017), we
provide a synthesis of the observations from all 11 case studies
(thus taking on board insights from the four case studies included
in the special feature but also the seven case studies that could not
be included). In addition, in the concluding contribution to this
feature (Meijerink and Huitema 2017) we draw general
conclusions, and address the fourth question posed in this
introduction.  
It is probably good to offer some explanation on why we are
focusing here on river basin organizations within countries and
why we subsequently selected the countries that were included
here and in our broader project (Huitema and Meijerink 2014).
The focus on national discussions on river basin organizations
stems from the personal preferences by the editors, but is also
related to the fact that basin organizations within country borders
are logically a more common and frequent form of organization
than the special case of transboundary RBOS, which have in fact
attracted a large, perhaps disproportionate, amount of attention
already from water governance scholars (for examples, see Beach
et al. 2000, Rieu-Clarke 2005, Conca 2006, Molle et al. 2009,
Schmeier 2013).  
The selection of countries and cases presented in this special
feature and the broader comparison presented in Huitema and
Meijerink (2014) has not been steered by conceptual
considerations as much as one would normally like. In the ideal
situation one would select such cases on the basis of either the
independent or the dependent variable, and the chances they pose
to reject explicit hypotheses surrounding these key variables. The
issues we are grappling with cannot be framed so neatly however.
Our contribution is first to see whether the new typology of RBOs
can be applied to real world cases (this is not a matter of rejecting
hypotheses, except perhaps of course that we expected the
typology to work). Second, we wish to see how proponents and
opponents of RBOs tried to influence RBO design, third, to see
whether certain types of RBOs perform better than other types,
and finally to derive recommendations. Only for the performance
issue one might say that there is a working hypothesis in the
literature, which would be that autonomous RBOs will perform
better (see the previous discussion on environmental
effectiveness), but this hypothesis has certainly also been
challenged extensively.  
The implication is that the contributions to this feature should be
seen largely as inductive empirical studies, and only to a limited
degree as focusing on deductive hypothesis testing. Despite that
being the case, the special feature makes a contribution to the
overall discussion on adaptive governance and water governance
more broadly, by better conceptualizing river basin organizations
as an example of a bioregional approach, and by asking questions
about the politics surrounding the foundation of RBOs (and by
implication bioregional organizations). The issue of politics has
been treated in the existing literature on RBOs of course, but is
often quickly dispatched as a problem, as something irrational in
the way of an otherwise brilliant plan and something that should
be done away with rather than analyzed more profoundly
(exceptions include Schlager and Blomquist 2008). In bringing
together multiple country case studies, we hoped to show that
politics always play a role in these discussions and simply cannot
be treated as the irrational part of the equation. In methodological
terms, it could be argued that our collection presents the most
different systems approach, which implies that when the relation
between two variables (says politics and institutional design) is
found across a number of very different systems (or countries)
this can be seen as corroboration that the variables are indeed
causally related; in fact the more countries are tested for and the
greater the differences between them, the greater the confidence
in the finding of a connection (Hopkin 2002).  
The set of three questions we ask about every country (as indicated
the fourth question is reserved for the final article) may seem
simple at first, but answering them actually requires quite a bit of
in depth knowledge of the case studies. In combination with the
fact that we mostly have an inductive and exploratory agenda,
this means that in this feature we opted for collaboration with
colleagues who intimately knew the case studies they describe
beforehand. By collaborating with us, and applying our
framework, they were invited to present this knowledge in a way
that was fitting with our purpose, and they helped us to explore
the questions we asked. We acknowledge that working with
authors who are familiar with certain case studies has potential
downsides. It might introduce certain biases (some authors may
have become attached to “their” case studies) and it could have
implied an exclusive focus on parts of the world for which many
analyses already exist. We have worked to erase any biases
emanating from familiarity with the case study by submitting all
papers to peer review (all authors read each other’s work and
critically commented on previous versions during a meeting in
Amsterdam, the Netherlands). It is obviously up to the reader to
decide whether these biases were indeed effectively removed, but
we believe that to be the case.  
Another potential criticism of our case study selection could be
related to the fact that the RBOs studied in the various countries
do differ quite considerably in geographical scale. This is a
consequence of our way of selecting cases (based on the expertise
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of the authors, not on the comparability of the case studies). And
to our mind this variation offers mainly advantages from a
methodological perspective (see the comment about the most
different systems approach) and from a conceptual perspective,
because the variation in geographical size does offer an
opportunity to see whether certain types of RBOs (like
partnerships) are indeed confined to the very local scale, as is often
assumed in the literature (perhaps this is another rare example of
a testable hypothesis). Before we now turn to the various
contributions to this special feature, we briefly introduce the
various cases that will be described, by already revealing which
type of RBO they represent, and which conclusions we were able
to draw about this type of RBO based on the broader selection
of case studies described in Huitema and Meijerink (2014). In
this special feature, we will encounter two examples of
coordinating type RBOs, specifically the Mackenzie River Basin
Board (MRB) in Canada, which is described by Michelle Morris
and Rob de Loë (2016), and the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial
Council in Australia and the Basin Community Committee there
as described by Andrew Ross and Daniel Connell (2016; they also
discuss the Murray-Darling Basin Authority, but this is an agency
type of organization). Several common threads weave the stories
on coordinating type of RBOs together. In terms of institutional
design, these organizations all have an indirect mandate, derived
from the organizations that have founded them. This means that
the pattern of institution building can usually best be described
as layering, meaning that the new institution is just another layer
in an already complex setting. Two points become clear about the
process of layering, one about bureaucratic politics, and about
the relation to more traditional institutions. As for bureaucratic
politics, the founding organizations, be they ministries, provinces,
or other forms of government, are not in the game wholeheartedly.
This means that there are usually organizations that try to limit
the amount of resources that the new organizations will obtain
(in terms of finances, in terms of information flows, in terms of
decision power) either by institutional design, or by not
collaborating with the RBOs once they have been founded. As for
the relation to more traditional (or indigenous) institutions, it is
noteworthy that RBO design often does not fully involve these
institutions, or even neglects their existence. Part of the reason
for that is that the idea for the foundation of the RBO comes from
outside the circles that were managing water before. This is not
so much visible in the two case studies included in this special
feature, but our broader collection (Huitema and Meijerink 2014)
contains cases in developing and transition countries like
Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Ukraine, and there, foreign parties
such as consultancies from Western countries carry the
international thinking on RBOs to these countries, usually
accompanied by national allies that stand to gain with the RBO
or support the idea intellectually. Such parties enter through
windows of opportunity created by various recurring factors,
such as the dependency on foreign subsidies, broader societal and
political changes, and an active political leadership that supports
innovation. The dependency on other parties, but also the fact
that the initiative comes from outside traditional water circles,
goes a long way to explain the relative weakness of almost all
coordinating RBOs described in this special feature and the
underlying larger project (Huitema and Meijeirnk 2014) in terms
of resources and authority. As a correlate, performance is often
judged to be relatively poor by our authors, with in some cases
traditional institutions actually needed to help out in terms of
coordination in times of crises (which underpins the case for
institutional diversity and polycentricism perhaps).  
There are examples of agency type RBOs in this special feature,
specifically the Breede-Overberg Catchment Management
Agency in South Africa, described by Richard Meissner, Nikki
Funke, and Karen Nortje (2016), and the Murray-Darling Basin
Authority in Australia as discussed by Andrew Ross and Daniel
Connell (2016). In our broader set of case studies, we find case
studies from the U.S., Germany, and Ukraine too. In each of these
countries agencies coexist with coordinating types of RBOs in
one way or another. Often agencies take on the role of the
implementing branch, under the umbrella of a coordinating
organization. It is interesting to observe that some RBOs in this
small subset of cases have a relatively narrow mandate, focusing,
for instance, on salmon restoration, which fits within our
typology, but also that some agency type RBOs turn out to have
a much broader mandate. For all agency type of RBOs, the
political sensitivity of their establishment and the key importance
of having sufficient resources is confirmed. The South African
case description (Meissner et al. 2016) details how over the course
of 14 years, only two out of 19 projected catchment management
agencies (CMAs) were actually founded. This is to do with
opponents to the decentralization drive implied in their
foundation, but the authors also claim that a lack of resources
(funding, capable personnel) is also to blame. In countries like
South Africa, the thinking about RBOs appears to be hesitant
and evolving. In South Africa CMAs are meant to be very much
under the wing of the relevant minister, until they have proven
they can function independently (when they become more purely
an agency). But given the paucity of actual experience with the
CMA model, their performance is actually quite hard to judge.  
In this special feature we also present the only example of a
partnership type RBO that was included in our broader selection
of case studies. Hadrian Cook, David Benson, and Laurence
Couldrick (2016) describe the case of the Westcountry Rivers
Trust from the Southwest of England. They suggest that the rise
of partnership type of basin organizations in the UK should be
seen in the light of low trust in the formal system of water
governance, which is dominated by agency type organizations.
The partnership nature of this RBO is reflected in its focus on
consensual decision making, local expertise, holistic approach,
and desire to find win-win solutions. In this particular case, the
initiators were successful in attracting outside resources (such as
from the European Union) and the authors consider its
performance to be relatively good.  
Having introduced the various guiding questions to the special
feature and the following contributions, we gladly invite the reader
to read the various case studies included in this special feature for
more detail on the nuances of RBO design, and to read the
concluding article of this special feature, Meijerink and Huitema
(2017), to get a systematic analysis the global comparative study
we performed.  
__________  
[1] The action situation is also influenced by natural circumstances
and culture, but these are factors that Ostrom has not elaborated
upon a lot.
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[2] Ostrom has indicated that rules work configurationally. This
implies that if  the “setting” of one type of rule changes, the total
set of rules is affected, and the rules will have a different effect
(Ostrom 1986). This insight is profound, but also potentially very
disruptive of our possibilities for generalization. Imagine an
institutional arrangement wherein 50 positions are specified, each
associated with 50 boundary rules, 50 information rules, etc. If  it
is true that a change in one of these rules affects the entire setting
and effectively a new institutional arrangement is created, we
would end up with a massive amount of possible institutional
configurations, with assumedly all very different outcomes. Such
a complex web of options goes beyond the human capacity of
analysis and understanding. This is probably why Elinor Ostrom
is often associated simply with community-based management,
which could mean a range of things if  one applied her typology.
It is probably also why the impressive work Ostrom has done leads
to a set of relatively simple design guidelines (for instance that
the enforcement of rules and thus the design of enforcing
positions and authorities is important). For us, the conclusion is
that the level of sophistication in the analysis is better bounded,
and templates or shorthand such as the market or the state do
have some value.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/9409
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